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Game Theory has been gaining great importance in Economics, encouraging 
research in many theoretical and applied fields. This paper relies on simple 
game theory tools to set up a major international trade dispute. Using the 
backward deduction approach, the strategies of the United States and China 
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I-Introduction:  
Game theory is of great importance for analyzing imperfect competitive 
markets that have more than one interacted agent with different conflicting objectives 
and strategies. This makes game theory a suitable way to model international trade 
relations. International trades for many commodities are usually dominated by 
exports, government policies and multinational companies (Karp & McCalla, 1983). 
This paper attempts to show how game theory tools can be used to analyze the 
decision of countries under an international dispute. 
One hotly contested conflict of the global economy is China’s staggering rise 
of exports in the world market. In the wake of this experience, many industrial 
countries accuse China of unfairly backing up its competitiveness by dumping 
policies as well as by using fixed exchange rate policies that underestimate the value 
of the Chinese currency in order to keep its import price very low. In particular, the 
United States perceives itself as the major victim of China’s trade policy: The United 
States of America have a trade merchandise deficit with China since 1984. This trade 
deficit has accelerated to more than 201 billion in 2005, which is ten times the deficit 
the United States have with other Asian countries. For example, the U.S. deficit with 
Malaysia is $23.3 billion, with South Korea $16.1 billion, and with Taiwan $12.8 
billion (Lum and Danto 2007
1). To reduce such high deficits, the U.S. parliament 
decided to take some protectionist actions to defend domestic interests. In May 2005, 
the U.S. Congress agreed to set a 27.5% tariff on Chinese exports if China would not 
appreciate its currency at least by 10% (Francis, 2005). According to CRS reports 
(Martin, 2008), the Chinese Renminbi (the Chinese currency which is also known as 
Yuan) appreciated about 15% nearly since January 2007.  
A Game is constructed in this paper between China and United States as an 
attempt to understand on what basis the two countries built their decisions (United 
States threatening China and China adopting a gradual appreciation currency 
program). The analysis used in this paper exploits the setting’s analogy to an entry 
game discussed in Rasmusen (2001, pp. 15): Rasmusen, using a decision game tree, 
demonstrated that the best strategy of a dry cleaners producer, who is considering to 
enter the market or not, depends on the threatened retaliation of the incumbent.  
                                                  
1 See appendix table (1).   - 2 -
Following the example of Rasmusen, the following trade policy game takes all 
factors into consideration which affect the disputes between the two countries. The 
payoffs of the game are assumed to be the trade balances of the countries. To solve 
the game, the backward deduction method is used to determine the optimal decision 
for each of the two countries. 
II- Trade Game:  
1.  Back ground for the Game: 
For more than two decades, the United States has depended on unilateral 
agreements to expand its own exports. According to trade law section 301, it has the 
right to threat the trade partner of imposing trade protectionist in case the partner 
country does not expand American opportunities in its domestic market. For Example, 
the American pressure imposed on South Korea that led South Korea dropped all 
health requirements it has been imposing on meat imported from the United States 
(Kherallah and Beghin, 1998)  
United States is following the same strategy with China in order to decrease 
the coercion of China's export on the domestic production. American Government 
continuously calls China to float its exchange rate in order to decrease the damage 
created from the unfair trade advantage created from having a cheap Yuan. According 
to the CRS (Congressional Research Service) the Chinese currency needs to be 
appreciated by 40% in order to reflect its true value (Sanford, 2005). Due to the 
damage of this currency manipulation, the United States pressured China to appreciate 
its currency by 10% or otherwise the US will impose 27.5% tariff on imported 
products from China.  
United States represents the largest importer of goods from China, according 
to CRS reports, American importers from China reached $243.4 billion in 2005 
compared to $108.5 billion Japanese imports from China, and $183.7 billion the 
European Union imports (Lum and Danto, 2007). Thus China have to carefully 
respond to US threats taking into consideration how serious the US will be in binding 
its threats.  
A game is constructed in order to analyze the decision of the United States to 
threaten China and the respond of China to this threat. During the game, two main 
forces of nature (forces decided according external factors outside the game) are   - 3 -
considered: first, how far US is serious concerning this threat. It is true that the United 
States is suffering high trade deficit on one side but benefiting low cost Chinese 
products on the other side which definitely improved households’ purchasing power. 
In addition, American firms (such as Boeing, Ford, General Motors, IBM and 
Motorola) are benefiting cheap imported inputs that expand their production as well 
as US job opportunities. According to the Information Technology Association of 
America, job opportunities created in information technology in 2003 only due to 
Chinese and Indian development about 90,000 new jobs (Gilboy, 2004). Moreover, 
the United States is considered the fifth largest source of FDI in China (Foreign 
Investment in China, 2006), so decreasing Chinese exports means decreasing the 
income of such American multinational companies and investors in China. Thus, it is 
not recommended to improve the country’s trade balance on the expense of the 
American individual's income. In addition, the United States fears that putting 
pressure on China and taking restrictive actions against its exports would lead China 
to decrease its purchase of US treasury securities while China represent the second 
biggest country purchasing US treasury security (Morrison, 2008a) 
Second, through the game, the ability of China to keep its level of trade 
balance in spite of the pressure of currency appreciation or tariff restriction is 
considered. China would take defensive actions to safeguard its returns in the balance 
of payments. As to imports, these actions can be putting subsidies on its agricultural 
goods at the home town so that the agricultural imports from the U.S. will still be 
more expensive for the Chinese. Regarding the manufactured exports to the U.S. 
China can make its goods more competitive by investing in higher quality products 
and innovation so that even with a higher price, Americans will still demand the 
Chinese manufactured goods over the U.S. local goods. This is in addition to the fact 
that Chinese average surplus balance of payment growth rate between the periods 
(2000-2005) is 23.5%
2 which means that the usual growth in exports from year to year 
could cover the effect of the appreciation in currency.  
                                                  
2 Calculated according to the Data available from US Department of Commerce (Lum. and Danto, 
2007).   - 4 -
 
2.  Settings of the Game: 
a.  Players: 
-  First Player : United States 
-  Second Player : China 
b.  Strategies: 
-  Strategies For United States:  
United States has mainly two strategies we try to analyze which is better: 
•  Strategy A: To threat China and call for Yuan appreciation. 
•  Strategy B: Not to threat China and keep the status quo.  
-  Strategies For China:  
China has to take decision only if the United States chooses Strategy A but 
if the US chooses Strategy B then the Game Stops 
China First has to take decision whether: 
•  To respond to US threat with appreciating the currency: in this 
case it has to choose between: 
o  Appreciating with 10% 
o  Appreciating with 5%  
o  Appreciating with 3% 
•  To not respond to US threat with appreciating the currency: in this 
case it has to choose between other ways of responding such as: 
o  Trade war: China would impose tariff on the United States’ 
exports to China. 
o  No Trade War: this means not responding at all.  
 
c.  Constructing the Game: 
-  The Game can be explained by four Stages:   - 5 -
•  At Stage I:  
The United States has to choose either to threat ( Strategy A) or not threat 
(Strategy B) 
•  At Stage II: 
 China has to take the decision which depends on the US choice at Stage I, 
IF US chooses 
  Strategy A: Then China has to choose weather to respond with 
appreciation  (Strategy R)  or not responding with appreciation 
(Strategy N) 
  Strategy B: Then China has to take no actions and the status 
quo will remain and thus the game stops. 
•  At Stage III:  
China still has to take decisions depending on its decision in Stage II, if 
China chooses: 
  Strategy R: Then it has to choose whether to appreciate its 
currency with 10% as US called for or with a medium level 5% or 
low level 3% 
  Strategy N: Then it has to decide whether to start a trade war or 
not. 
•  At Stage IV:  
No decisions are taken but other factors that affect the decision of the 
game are considered, such as: 
  The ability of China to keep the supply and demand on its 
exports and imports constant. So there is two variations in this 
case: 
1.  Having a fixed payoff. 
2.  Having a changing payoff according to forces of 
supply and demand.   - 6 -
  How serious US in imposing tariffs on China. This is not a 
decision taken in the game but it is decided according to the effect 
on individual and multinational companies’ income. So it is 
considered whether the US is really willing to abide by its threat or 
not . 
   In case China appreciates with less than 10% three variation 
are considered: 
1.  Imposing the whole amount of tariff 27.5%.  
2.  Imposing medium amount weighted by how 
much Chinese currency is appreciated. In case China 
appreciates by 5%: a middle situation where the Yuan 
appreciates from 8.1943 to 7.784585. In this case China 
has only followed 50% of The US request, thus US will 
impose tariffs by an amount 13.75% ( = 0.5*27.5% 
which is the tariff US is threatening to impose on China 
if does not appreciate its currency). While In case China 
appreciates by 3%: low level of appreciation, the Yuan 
appreciates from 8.1943 to 7.948471. In this case China 
has only followed 30% of The US request, thus US will 
impose tariffs by an amount 19.25% ( = 0.7*27.5%) 
3.  Imposing no Tariff at all 
-  To reach the optimal decision for every country, a game decision tree 
is constructed, and backward deduction method is used.   - 7 -
 
d.  The Decision Tree: 
Figure (1): The Decision Tree for Trade Game: 
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Figure Explanation:  
• 
Decision game tree explains the Trade Game between China and United States. At every point, payoffs are 
calculated taking inconsideration all variations of the situation so far. Then backward deduction analysis is used 
to reach the optimal decision for the two players. 
• 
Every Square represent a decision should be taken, while every circle represents forces of nature.  
 
According to the decision game tree, the game can be explained as 
follows, The United States is the first player and it has to choose between 
threatening China (strategy A) or not (strategy B). In case, the United States 
chooses strategy B, the game stops as the status quo is reached. If United States 
chooses strategy A, then it is China’s turn to take decision.    - 8 -
China has either to respond to American threat by appreciating the 
currency (strategy R) or not responding by appreciation (strategy N). If China 
chooses strategy R then it is facing another choice by how much to appreciate. If 
China chooses strategy N, then it has to choose between not responding at all or 
responding with other means like imposing tariff on US goods. 
In case China chooses strategy R, China has to choose between three 
decisions taking inconsideration the forces of nature that would affect the payoff 
for every decision: 
i.  Appreciating with 10%: then there is 100% probability that the US will not 
impose any tariffs but China should take inconsideration that it might keep 
the trade balance fixed or it might decrease due to having the price of its 
currency increased and thus the price of its products increased in comparison 
to that of United States. 
ii.  Appreciating with 5%: there is probability that United States impose the 
whole tariff (27.5%) or medium level (13.75%) or not imposing at all. For 
every variation the payoffs are also affected by the ability of China to keep 
fixed trade balance situation. 
iii.  Appreciating with 3%: there is also probability that US impose the whole 
tariff (27.5%) or medium level (22.25%) or not imposing at all. And again 
for every variation payoffs are affected by the ability of China to keep a 
fixed trade balance. 
In case China chooses strategy N, China has to choose between two 
variations either: 
i.  Start a trade war and thus US will definitely impose 27.5% tariff. 
ii.  Not start a trade war and not respond at all. The payoffs at this point are 
affected by whether the United States is really intending to abide by its 
threat or not. In case the United States chooses not to abide by the threat, the 
status quo is reached. While in case it decided to abide by the threat, the 
payoffs are affected by the ability of China to keep fixed trade balance or 
not. 
e.  The Game Payoffs: 
To calculate the payoffs, the following is considered:   - 9 -
-  We start with the exports and imports for year 2005 data according to 
CRS reports (Lum and Danto, 2007) convert it in Yuan according to CRS official 
exchange rate reports $1=8.1943 Yuan (CRS reports, Sandford, 2005). Then calculate 
the expected payoffs (trade balance) China and the United States would achieve in US 
$ (dollars).  
-  US mainly imports manufactured and technological products from 
China and exports agricultural products (Francis, 2005). According to the US 
Agriculture Economic Research Department, the average elasticity of agricultural 
product over the world is -0.34
3 thus the price elasticity of imported agricultural 
products from the United States to China is -0.34. While, the price elasticity of the 
imported products by United States from China is nearly 1 (as it is a basket of 
different products that average elasticity all together is 1). 
-  With variation in quantity, the following is considered:  
•  Every 1% appreciation in the Chinese products means a 0.34% increase in 
Chinese imports and 1% decrease in exports.  
•  Incase of imposing tariff on Chinese exports, 1% tariff imposed means 1% 
exports decrease. 
-  Incase China decided to start a trade war: 1% tariff imposed on 
American exports means 0.34 decreases in Chinese Imports. It is also assumed that 
China will not take other defensive actions thus there is no probability of having fixed 
trade balance. 
-  Every payoff is calculated taking in consideration the situation of 
currency appreciation.  
f.  Assigning Probabilities: 
As stage IV, there are two main factors (the ability of China to keep 
constant quantities and the seriousness of US to impose tariff) are treated as 
forces of nature which means they are choices for the country but does not 
depend on the payoffs represented in the game. Thus probabilities are assigned 
for every variation as we are not sure which will occur in reality. 
                                                  
3 Calculated according to the International Food Consumption Patterns available At the US official 
Agriculture website; Economic Research Services.    - 10 -
Different Probabilities are assigned for the different variations as 
follows:  
i.  China has achieved a growing role on the international trade basis, 
it was able to achieve trade surplus with most of countries ( total 
exports for China id $ 1,218 billion in 2007 (Morrison, 2008b)), 
achieve highest growth rates ( reported as 11.4% in 2007 according 
to Morrison, 2008b), create the most preferred manufacturing plat 
form for companies (according to Morrison, 2008b, fifty percent of 
trade in China is dominated by foreign investment ) and even 
displace the Japanese and Americans position among South East 
Asian countries not only as trade partners but as source of 
economic assistance as well (Nato, 2008). Taking in consideration 
such progress China has lately achieved, the probability that it will 
be capable to keep its trade balance constant is higher than having 
decrease in trade surplus. Thus the probability of having fixed trade 
balance is 60% . 
ii.  Appreciating with 10% implies a zero probability of imposing US 
tariff. In contrast, appreciating by an amount of less than 10% will 
increase the probability that the US imposes a tariff. 
iii.  The United States would prefer to keep free trade in order not to be 
accused by the rest of the world of being violating the open trade 
rules it has set, in addition to the pressure the government would 
face from American investors in China and decrease in US treasury 
bills purchased by China. Thus: 
•  If China appreciates with 5% or 3%: The probability of 
not imposing a tariff is 0.5, the probability of imposing a 
medium level tariff is 0.3, while the probability of imposing 
the whole tariff is 0.2. 
•  If China does not respond at all (Strategy N and No 
Trade War), the probability that the United States abide by 
its threat and impose 27.5% on Chinese products should 
increase in comparison to the situation where China    - 11 -
appreciates. Thus, the probability that the US abide by its 
threat is 0.5 and for “not abide” also 0.5. 
iv.  If China started a trade war, there is 100% probability that the 
United States will impose the whole tariff. Also a 100% probability 
that there will be changes in trade balance as China will not take 
other defensive actions. 
g.  Game  Outcome: 
Table (1) summarizes the outcome of the game. The Payoffs represented in the 
table are the Payoffs for China while that of United States are just the same but 
in negative values. 
According to the table above, for US it is better to threat as this would increase 
the probability to decrease its trade deficit even with high probability that it 
will not bide to its threat. For China the highest payoff for China is keeping 
the status quo, while if US imposed tariffs the highest payoff is achieved for 
China when it appreciates its currency with 10%. Thus China would choose 
Strategy R and appreciate with 10% and US would better threat China as this 
would decrease its trade deficit. 
It is remarkable for China, that the difference between not responding at all 
and appreciating with 10% is slightly small which implies the strength of the 
Chinese economy towards any international disputes in spite of its highly 
integration in the global world.  
The outcome of the game is very near to reality as United States threatened 
China to use protection tools if it does not appreciate its currency. As U.S. 
Congress agreed to set a 27.5% tariff on Chinese exports if China would not 
appreciate its currency at least by 10% in May 2005 (Francis, 2005). In 
addition, President Bush has raised the issue of Chinese currency in many 
international meetings and the congress has raised a number of disputes in the 
WTO against China (Morrison, 2008a).    - 12 -
Table 1: The outcome of Game I (in billion US $): 
Case  Payoff  P of changes 
in Q 
Payoff   P of Tariff  Payoff 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 10%  0 tariff  No change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 10%  0 tariff 
Δ in Q 
↑in imports by 




191.22  191.22 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  27.5%  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  27.5% 
↑ imports by  





Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  13.75%  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  13.75% 
↑ imports by  





Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  0 Tariff  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  0 Tariff 
↑ imports by  
1.7% & ↓ in  




Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  27.5%  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  27.5%  ↑ imports by 





Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  13.75%  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  13.75% 
↑ imports by  





Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  0 Tariff  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  0 Tariff 
↑ imports by  
1.02% & ↓ in  















160.6 -  160.6   160.6 
Strategy A  Strategy N  No  Trade 
War 
27.5% No  Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy N  No  Trade 
War 
27.5% 





Strategy A  Strategy N  No  Trade 
War 
0 Tariff  Status Quo  201.5    201.5  0.5 
191.1 
Strategy B  Status Quo  201.5 
Source: Constructed by the authors based on the settings of the game. 
 
Concerning China, it did not react on the spot but started a gradual currency 
appreciation. In July 2005, the Bank of China announced a gradual appreciation    - 13 -
program. From July 2005 till may 2008 it is estimate that China has appreciated its 
currency by about 16%. However, many members of the WTO still believe that 
Chinese currency real value is still higher than the official rate (Morrison, 2008a). 
This can be explained through the outcome of this game as the Chinese government 
knew that it is better to appreciate but it does not worth much so there is no need to 
rush but a well planned program would be the best choice. 
h.  Sensitivity Analysis: 
The outcome of the game highly depends on the assigned probabilities. Thus 
in this section a sensitivity analysis is carried to show how changing the assigned 
probabilities would affect the outcome of the game. It is remarkable that: 
•  For the probability that China keeps a fixed trade balance, the higher 
the probability assigned the higher the payoff for China. This implies 
the importance that China takes defensive actions to improve its 
imports and exports level against the external threats. 
•  Regardless the probability of having fixed trade balance for China, it is 
always better to appreciate with 10% and the difference between the 
payoffs of appreciating with 10% and not responding at all is slightly 
small. 
•  If the probability that US not imposing tariff is higher than 0.5 (under 
Strategy N), then it is always better for China not to respond at all and 
the difference in comparison to appreciation with 10% is slightly small. 
•  Regardless the probability assigned, appreciating with 10% is better 
than appreciating with 5% or 3%. 
 
It is also important to highlight the following concerning the game payoff: 
•  The highest payoff for China if the status quo is kept.  
•  China starting a trade war is not a profitable choice for China, but for 
the United States. 
•  It is always better for the United States to threat even with high 
probability not to abide to its threat (thus strategy B is never chosen). 
    - 14 -
III-Conclusion:  
 
The general strategy of the United States trade policy is to expand exports and to 
reduce foreign trade barriers against U.S. goods and services. Actually, the U.S. trade 
law section 301 is one of the most important tools that the United States have used to 
achieve its target. According to this law, the U.S imposes pressures on other countries 
through threatening to impose trade barriers if the specific country refuses to open its 
market. The procedures of Section 301 start when a U.S. firm or industry accuses a 
certain country of discriminating exports, causing limitations to the U.S. commerce, 
or affecting the domestic market negatively. If the accusations are accepted by the 
U.S. government, it threats to impose bilateral tariffs in order to support its own 
producers (Kherallah & Beghin, 1998). As a recent example, the U.S. have imposed 
pressure on China to appreciate its currency in order to give more opportunities for 
American producers, especially in the textile and apparel, toys and steel industry. The 
congress has asked the administration to make China appreciate its currency in order 
to decrease the tension set on domestic producers. Actually, the Yuan is cheap: 
According to Morrison (2008a), the real value of the Chinese currency is 40% higher 
than its official value in 2005. 
The Chinese officials have used a crawling peg exchange rate policy, which is 
a managed floating policy for the official exchange rate that allows for adjustments in 
the value as long as these adjustments do not affect the economic policy (Martin, 
2008). China feared that appreciating its currency relative the dollar and to fixed 
Asian countries would negatively affect the stability of its economy (Morrison, 
2008a). 
Using decision tree analysis which is a vital tool in game theory, we were able 
to resolve the pressures set on China regarding trade and analyze the best option for 
China – the one that will maximize its payoffs. As a main result, China should 
positively respond to the U.S. call of appreciating the Yuan, because this is the choice 
that will maximize China’s payoffs. However, we also show that China still has the 
option resist the U.S. pressures. Though this would not be the optimal decision for 
China, the incurred losses will not be heavy. 
Having derived these results, the reasons of this surprising strength against the 
U.S. and the rest of the world are analyzed. Actually, China’s strength is based on the    - 15 -
edges in trade it has made over time. China has a significant trade surplus not only 
against the U.S., but also against the rest of the world. This position as a dominant 
export nation implies strength, however, because all actions it will take will affect the 
payoffs of the rest of the world. Being heavily dependent on the stream of goods made 
the other trading partners including the United States cautious in dealing with China. 
As a general implication of this result, countries with effective “weapons” can 
be independent from international pressures, though we acknowledge that this will 
reduce global wealth. For example, developing countries can invest into the 
production of just a few goods, where they have at the same time a competitive 
advantage as well as a vast market in other countries. In a globalized world, these 
highly competitive goods are not only the source of revenue streams, but they can also 
be strong weapons for general trade strategies. If China’s exports were not 
competitive, the U.S. wouldn’t wait so long for China to respond. China will not even 
have had the option to be reluctant in applying the orders of the U.S. The Chinese 
exports made the U.S. unable to stop its trade with China.    - 16 -
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Appendix: 
 
Table (1) United States Merchandise Trade Balance with different Asian 
Countries 
 
year  China  Indonesia   S.Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan  Thailand
1984 -377 -4,674  -4,188  -9,983  -913 -11,266  -381 
1985 -373 -4,152  -4,992  -936  -959 -13,295  -804 
1986 -2,135 -2,757 -7,588 -807  -805  -16,069  -1,018 
1987 -3,422 -2,955  -10,326  -1,159  -898  -19,221  -904 
1988 -4,237 -2,438  -10,578  -1,715 -1,069  -14,314  -1,739 
1989 -7,094 -2,618 -7,115  -2,052 -1,102  -14,305  -2,343 
1990 -11,488 -1,785  -4,888 -2,071 -1,151  -12,347  -2,597 
1991 -14,018 -1,675  -2,224 -2,446 -1,439  -11,038  -2,693 
1992 -19,943 -1,927  -2,732 -4,144 -1,870  -10,601  -3,944 
1993 -24,927 -3,117  -3,003 -4,858 -1,646  -10,050  -5,214 
1994 -32,076 -4,209  -2,346 -7,454 -2,137  -10,864  -5,938 
1995 -36,772 -4,599  523  -9,162  -2,070  -10,863  -5,452 
1996 -42,431 -4,778  3,286 -9,809 -2,372  -12,610  -4,587 
1997 -53,026 -5,222  1,269 -7,695 -3,370  -13,331  -5,699 
1998 -56,927 -7,042  -7,456  -10,043 -5,211  -14,960  -8,198 
1999 -68,668 -7,575  -8,308  -12,349 -5,153  -16,077  -9,340 
2000 -83,810 -7,839 -12,398  -14,573 -5,147  -16,134  -9,747 
2001 -83,045 -7,605 -12,988  -12,956 -3,666  -15,239  -8,733 
2002  -103,115  -7,062 -12,979  -13,661  -3,715  -13,805  -9,939 
2003  -123,960  -6,999 -12,864  -14,517  -2,068  -14,111  -9,338 
2004  -161,977  -8,142 -19,829  -17,288  -2,072  -12,866  -11,214 
2005  -201,625  -8,971 -16,106  -23,252  -2,355  -12,788  -12,569 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Commission. (Lum & Nanto, 2007, p.45) 
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Table (2): US Merchandise Trade with China (1984-2005) 
 
Year  US Exports  US Imports  US Trade Balance 
1984 3,004 3,381 -377 
1985 3,856 4,224 -373 
1986 3,106 5,241  -2,135 
1987 3,497 6,910  -3,422 
1988 5,017 9,261  -4,237 
1989 5,807  12,901  -7,094 
1990 4,807  16,296  -11,488 
1991 6,287  20,305  -14,018 
1992 7,470  27,413  -19,943 
1993 8,767  31,183  -24,927 
1994 9,287  41,362  -32,076 
1995 11,749  48,521  -36,772 
1996 11,978  54,409  -42,431 
1997 12,805  65,832  -53,026 
1998 14,258  75,109  -56,927 
1999 13,118  81,786  -68,668 
2000 16,253  100,063  -83,810 
2001 19,234  102,280  -83,045 
2002 22,053  125,167  -103,115 
2003 26,806  151,620  -123,960 
2004 34,721  196,699  -161,977 
2005  41,836 243,462  -201,625 
Sources: U.S. data from U.S. Department of Commerce. (Lum & Nanto, 2007,p.41) 
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Table (3): The effect on Payoff setting different probabilities: 
 
Table (3a): Changing the probability that China ability to keep fixed trade balance: 
 
Case  Payoff  P of changes 
in Q 
Payoff   P of Tariff  Payoff 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 10%  0 tariff  No change  201.5  0.8 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 10%  0 tariff 
Δ in Q 
↑in imports by 




196.63  196.63 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  27.5%  No Change  201.5  0.8 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  27.5% 
↑ imports by  





Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  13.75%  No Change  201.5  0.8 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  13.75% 
↑ imports by  





Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  0 Tariff  No Change  201.5  0.8 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  0 Tariff 
↑ imports by  
1.7% & ↓ in  




Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  27.5%  No Change  201.5  0.8 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  27.5%  ↑ imports by 





Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  13.75%  No Change  201.5  0.8 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  13.75% 
↑ imports by  





Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  0 Tariff  No Change  201.5  0.8 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  0 Tariff 
↑ imports by  
1.02% & ↓ in  















160.6 -  160.6   160.6 
Strategy A  Strategy N  No  Trade 
War 
27.5% No  Change  201.5  0.8 
Strategy A  Strategy N  No  Trade 
War 
27.5% 






Strategy A  Strategy N  No  Trade 
War 
0 Tariff  Status Quo  201.5    201.5  0.5 
196.3 
Strategy B  Status Quo  201.5 
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Table (3b): Changing the Probability of US imposing Tariff: 
Case  Payoff  P of changes 
in Q 
Payoff   P of Tariff  Payoff 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 10%  0 tariff  No change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 10%  0 tariff 
Δ in Q 
↑in imports by 




191.22  191.22 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  27.5%  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  27.5% 
↑ imports by  





Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  13.75%  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  13.75% 
↑ imports by  





Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  0 Tariff  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App. 5%  0 Tariff 
↑ imports by  
1.7% & ↓ in  




Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  27.5%  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  27.5%  ↑ imports by 





Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  13.75%  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  13.75% 
↑ imports by  





Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  0 Tariff  No Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy R  App.3%  0 Tariff 
↑ imports by  
1.02% & ↓ in  















160.6 -  160.6   160.6 
Strategy A  Strategy N  No  Trade 
War 
27.5% No  Change  201.5  0.6 
Strategy A  Strategy N  No  Trade 
War 
27.5% 





Strategy A  Strategy N  No  Trade 
War 
0 Tariff  Status Quo  201.5    201.5  0.6 
193.18 
Strategy B  Status Quo  201.5 
 